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A PLEA FOR BETTER TAX PLEADING
A CRITIQUE OF PLEADING IN TAX CONTROVERSIES BEFORE THE
BOARD OF TAX APPEALS*
RANDOLPH E. PAULt
The hiatus of time from Coke to Cardozo has resulted in a consider-
able liberalism of pleading and procedure, notwithstanding the "hue
and cry" of modem liberal pleading pedagogues to the contrary.'
The twentieth century has seen a liberalization in pleading in the
so-called code states. The angular corners of strict common law
"form of action" pleading2 have been polished smooth. Though the
former stereotyped rigid rules characteristic of the early common
law are now more or less legal history, the process is still fluid and there
is a real need for advocates of liberal pleading.
The spirit of experimentalism which has brought about this change
need not pine for more worlds to conquer. One branch of the law,
perhaps the most important branch from the standpoint of the
amount of money involved, remains so far as pleading is concerned,
a child. In it no real thought has been given to pleading.3 The
emphasis has been on determination and results; it has been forgot-
ten that pleading has a vital connection with determination and re-
suits.
Lack of attention to matters of pleading is today costing govern-
ment and taxpayers millions annually and is hampering the expedi-
tious handling of tax cases. Of further importance is the fact that if
we are not careful, this lack of attention will seriously affect the
growth of a body of substantive income and estate tax law.4
The effect of poor pleading on the substantive law of taxation is
twofold. In the first place, judges are best able to function in their
judicial capacity when the issues of the controversy are clearly
*Copyright, 1933, by Randolph B. Paul. This article is in part from the
author's forthcoming book on federal income taxation.
tMember of the New York, New Jersey and Federal Bars.
'See e. g. Sunderland, The English Struggle for Procedural Reform (1925) 39
HARV. L. REV. 725.
2The Code of Procedure in New York in 1848, the adoption of code provisions
in numerous other states and the New Jersey Practice Act modeled on the earlier
English reforms in procedure are some examples of the twentieth century liberali-
zation.
'E.g., The Enabling Act under which the Board of Tax Appeals was first created
and functioned-Title IX, Revenue Act of 1924, is wholly devoid of any provisions
regarding the type of pleading upon which appeals to the Board shall be based.
4Dean Wigmore in his very able critique on our system of evidence points out
that under our system of law generally, rules of evidence and procedure are built
up by the court at the expense of the parties litigant.
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presented. The soundness of the decision may often depend on the
clarity with which the issues are presented. In this respect Board
members are no different from members of the bench generally, able
and skilled they may be as a result of their experience in a specialized
field. They are not endowed, however, with a discernment sufficiently
omniscient to enable them to select the vital issues out of the con-
fusion of issues that often results from poor pleading. Secondly,
pleading which is loose in the sense that it does not apprise the parties
of the issues involved frequently results in a failure of proof.' The
great number of cases6 which are lost because of a failure of proof,
5This is especially true under existing tax procedure; see the discussion infra,
at p. 5II.
6The following are but a few cases which taxpayers have lost because of a failure
of proof: Commissioner v. Whitman, 49 F. (2d) 1087 (C.C.A. 2d, 193I) aff'g 16
B.T.A. 197 (1929); Industrial Co. v. U. S., 38 F. (2d) 711 (193o); Hubinger v.
Commissioner, 36 F. (2d) 724 (C.C.A. 2d, 1930) aff'g 13 B.T.A. 96o (1928)
certiorari denied. 281 U. S. 741 (193o); Washer v. Commissioner, 35 F. (2d) 1023
(C. C. A. 2d, 1929) aff'g 12 B.T.A. 632 (1928); Emil Ries, 25 B.T.A. 896 (1932);
EauClaire Book & Stationery Co., 25 B.T.A. 535 (1932); Philadelphia Paper
Mfg. Co., 25 B.T.A. 1231 (1932); R. L. Hague, 24 B.T.A. 288 (1931); Virginia H.
Parmelee, et al., 24 B.T.A. 48 (1931); Isaac P. Keeler, 23 B.T.A. 467 (1931);
I. A. Van Dyke, et al., 23 B.T.A. 946 (1931); A. Eimer, 23 B.T.A. 496 (1931);
Roy & Titcomb Inc., 23 B.T.A. 12 (i93i); California Fireproof Building Co.,
22 B.T.A. r128 (1931); Rising Sun Brewing Co., 22 B.T.A. 826 (193); L. G.
Hathaway, 21 B.T.A. 1280 (193i); Berkowitz Envelope Co., 21 B.T.A. 685
(1930); E. L. Potter, 2o B.T.A. 252 (1930); L. M. Klein, et al., 2o B.T.A. 1057
(193o); Tom Moore, 19 B.T.A. 140 (1930); Arcade Department Stores, Inc.,
18 B.T.A. 1172 (i93o); C. B. Hayes, I7 B.T.A. 86 (1929); Panyard Machine &
Mfg. Co., 17 B.T.A. 1053 (1929); R. T. Coburn, x6 B.T.A. 1344 (1929); W. J.
Paul, et al., Exrs., I6 B.T.A. 459 (1929); National Straw Works, 16 B.T.A. 463
(1929); Consolidated Companies, Inc., 15 B.T.A. 645 (1929); F. Russell Beebe,
et al., Exrs., 15 B.T.A. 1022 (1929); Semon Bache & Co. Inc., 15 B.T.A. 183
(1929); Louis Gunsberg, 14 B.T.A. 769 (1928); J. E. Robertson, 13 B.T.A. 55o
(1928); Theodore Aaron, 12 B.T.A. 556 (1928); The Fair Store Corp., Ii B.T.A.
1033 (1928); H. Symons, ii B.T.A. 886 (1928); Young Bros., IO B.T.A. 530
(1928); Davidson Grocery Co., 9B.T.A. 390 (1927); Foer Wallpaper Co., 9 B.T.A.
377 (1927); J. B. Rolater, 9 B.T.A. 73 (1927); J. H. Hulme, 9 B.T.A. 31 (1927);
Calumet Steel Co., 9 B.T.A. 174 (1927); R. W. Farmer Co., 9 B.T.A. 856 (1927);
F. A. Douty, 9 B.T.A. 218 (1927); L. A. Coleman, 9 B.T.A. 1386 (1928); Palatine
Analine & Chemical Corp., 8 B.T.A. 1149 (1927); N. B. Jordan, 7 B.T.A. 458
(1927); Kanawha Drug Co., 7 B.T.A. 683 (1927); Joseph E. Barlow, 7 B.T.A.
1232 (1927); L. T. Perls, et al., 7 B.T.A. 568 (1927); Estate of T. J. Taylor,
7 B.T.A. 931 (1927); Powers Mfg. Co., 7 B.T.A. 786 (1927); J. R. Buchanan,
7 B.T.A. 893 (1927); B. S. Catlett, 7 B.T.A. 213 (1927); Booth Furniture &
Carpet Co., 6 B.T.A. 886 (1927); T. G. Wilsford, 6 B.T.A. 813 (1927); S. L.
Fowler, 6 B.T.A. 250 (1927); C. B. Haynes Co. Inc., 6 B.TA. 88 (1927); Donaghey
Real Estate & Construction Co., 5 B.T.A. 766 (1926); Charles W. Nass, 5 B.T.A.
665 (1926); Hart-Wood Lumber Co., 5 B.T.A. 117 (1926); Barnett Weiss, 3 B.T.A.
228 (1925).
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results in a body of law which if properly read stands only as a monu-
ment to remind the taxpayer that he has the burden of proof in tax
controversies. More often, however,-and here lies the real danger
-they are apt to be read in the light of the results, that is, that
the board has, for example, refused to allow a certain type of de-
duction. It is in this latter connection that the cases resulting from
poor pleading may alter and shape the substantive law. 7
Income taxes and estate taxes have come to stay, and of our
many needs today not the least is a sound, uniform and rational body
of law relating to these forms of taxation.
Income and estate tax controversy has become concentrated in
the Board of Tax Appeals. That body has had jurisdiction since 1926
to determine refunds in cases where the Commissioner has deter-
mined a deficiency. Practically the only jurisdiction left for the
District Court and the Court of Claims are cases in which no de-
ficiency has been determined by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. Such cases are becoming increasingly rare.'
The Board of Tax Appeals is not a court.9 In the words of the
Supreme Court:
"It is an executive or administrative board upon the decision
of which, parties are given an opportunity to base a petition for
review before the courts after the administrative inquiry of the
board has been had and decided."' 0
Whatever may be the exact status of the Board-and the distinction
between a board and court is not material to this discussion-it
functions in practical fact as a court. In redetermining deficiencies
it exercises powers which are clearly judicial. Moreover, its proced-
7The reader should not imply from the author's criticism of the present system
of practice that it is altogether stereotyped. In all fairness to the board it should
be noted that the rules with respect to amending petitions are quite liberal.
(See for example, Bankers Realty Syndicate, 20 B.T.A. 612, 615 (193o)) Rule 18
permits the taxpayer to amend his petition as of course any time before the answer
is filed; after answer, by consent of the commissioner or on leave of the board.
The board in its discretion may even permit a party to a proceeding to amend
his pleadings at any time before the conclusion of the hearing. Such an amend-
ment of pleadings to conform to proof should be made upon motion.
8High tax rates, present economic conditions, and the necessity of collecting
more taxes, all impinging on the national budget situation, will undoubtedly be
reflected in the immediate future in a more rigorous analysis and contest of tax
returns; deficiency determination will doubtless increase tremendously.
9See e.g., Van Fossan, The United States Board of Tax Appeals (1933) 'FEDERAL
BAR Ass'N JOURNAL 17, in which the author, a member of the United States
Board of Tax Appeals, discusses the "judicial" nature of the Board.
10 01d Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, -79 U. S. 716,49 Sup. Ct. 340 (1929).
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ure is in fact similar in vital respects to the procedure in state and
federal courts in non-jury cases. Evidence is taken in precisely the
same manner,' objections are noted, exceptions are taken, closing
arguments are made on the basis of testimony taken, etc.12 The fact
is that the Board of Tax Appeals is in income and estate tax matters
the ultimate fact-finding body;13 as such it will long remain one of
the most important tribunals disposing of controversies between
government and citizen, 14 if not the most important tribunals dis-
posing of all controversies.
Many lawyers will go so far as to urge that the facts are the only
important thing in any controversy; 5 all will agree that they are of
the greatest and often decisive importance. In tax cases the responsi-
bility for finding the facts rests upon the Board. The Circuit Court
of Appeals will not review the Board upon the facts; if there is any
substantial evidence to support the Board's findings they will be
respected. 16
"Rule 38 of the Rules of Practice of the Board of Tax Appeals provides that:
"The parties may, by stipulation in writing filed with the Board or presented at
the hearing, agree upon any facts involved in the proceeding."
uBoard members, like judges, differ in the degree of formality characterizing
trials before them. Generally speaking, trials before the board are not less formal
than trials before the United States District Courts and the State Courts. They
are certainly not less formal than trials before the Court of Claims where the
evidence is taken before Commissioners corresponding to Masters in Chancery and
Referees in Bankruptcy.
'
3 Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U. S. 136 (1931); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283
U. S. 589, 5x Sup. Ct. 82 (1930).
"4This type of controversy is more and more in the work of the lawyer replacing
the controversy between citizen and citizen.
15See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (i930), p. 146.
"'Burnet v. Leininger and Phillips v. Commissioner, supra note i3; Com-
missioner v. Norfolk Southern R. Co., 63 F. (2d) 304 (C.C.A. 4th, 1933)
aff'g and rev'g 22 B.T.A. 302 (i93i); Universal Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 46 F.
(2d) 9o8 (C.C.A. 3d, 1931) aff'g x6 B.T.A. 788 (1929); American Savings Bank &
Trust Co. v. Burnet, 45 F. (2d) 548 (C.C.A. 7th, 1930) aff'g i8 B.T.A. 397 (1929);
Saxman Coal & Coke Co. v. Commissioner, 43 F. (2d) 556 (C.C.A. 3d, 1930)
aff'g 2 B.T.A. I75 (1925); Prey Bros. Live Stock Commission Co. v. Commissioner
36 F. (2d) 326 (C.C.A. ioth, 1929) aff'g 9 B.T.A. 534 (1927); Atlantic Coast
Distributors v. Commissioner, 33 F. (2d) 733 (C.C.A. 4th, 1929) rev'g 9 B.T.A.
69o (1927); Twin City Tile & Marble Co. v. Commissioner, 32 F. (2d) 229 (C.C.A.
8th, 1929) aff'g 6 B.T.A. 1238 (1927).
The rule that the Circtit Court will determine if there is sufficient evidence to
sustain the Board's decision calls for a distinction between primary and ultimate
facts. For example, in Bishoff v. Commissioner, 27 F. (2d) 91 (C.C.A. 3d, 1928)
aff'g 6 B.T.A. 570 (1927), the court accepted as primary findings the Board's
decision that the business of the taxpayer was credit and delivery, as distinguished
from cash and carry, that the books were carelessly kept, etc. However, the
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Counsel engaged in tax work need not be reminded of the com-
plexity of the facts upon which the decision in most tax cases depends.
But intricacy of facts is not the only concern of counsel. The hand-
ling of complex facts is a matter of trial technique; the difficulty is
more deep-rooted.
As will be seen from the discussion following, the litigant is con-
fronted with the problem of meeting any one or more of a number of
theories of law or contentions offered by the Commissioner. Thus,
uncertainty of the Commissioner's theory of the tax disputed-based
as it is on the present system of pleading-multiplies the facts so
needlessly that only a technician skilled in practice before the Board is
able to maintain a proper perspective. Persons less skilled are apt
to incur considerable expenses for the client by proving too much or
become so lost in the maze of detail that they fail in the proof of some
essential point of fact. 7 The very complexity and multiplicity of
the facts coupled with the immunity of the Board's determination of
them from attack makes it necessary to pause and think of the im-
portance of the machinery for finding the facts.' s Is that machinery
designed to produce most easily the most efficient result? Does it
produce that sort of result with the least trouble and expense to
government and taxpayer? Does it do so with reasonable dispatch?
These are broad questions the answers to which are beyond the
scope of this short article. It is task enough at the moment to limit
the question and to analyze one part of the mechanism designed to
Board's decision that the taxpayer's books did not clearly reflect his income
was an ultimate fact which the court would scan to determine if it was supported
by the evidence. It is clear, therefore, that the Circuit Court of Appeals has ample
power to search the record to find whether any substantial evidence supports
the findings of the Board because whether there is any such evidence is a question
of law and not of fact: Franklin Lumber & Power Co. v. Commissioner, 5o F.
(2d) 1029 (C.C.A. 4th, i93i) rev'g i8 B.T.A. 1207 (193o); Edson v. Lucas, 4o F.
(2d) 398 (C.C.A. 8th, 193o) rev'g xix B.T.A. 621 (1928); St. Paul Abstract Co. v.
Commissioner, 32 F. (2d) 225 (C.C.A. 8th, 1929) aff'g 6 B.T.A. 1225 (1927).
17See, e.g., Alger-Sullivan Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 57 F. (2d) 3 (C.C.A.
5th, 1932) rev'g 2o B.T.A. iio9 (i93o) and more particularly the court's state-
ment at p. 5," * * * it is apparent that the point was not deemed to be material
by either petitioner or respondent in the proceedings before the Board * * * "
Finding the question material the court was compelled to remand the case to the
board for a further hearing.
18As a member of the Board of Tax Appeals has said, Van Fossan, op. cit. supra
note 9 at 22, "In the matter of appeals the records show approximately two affirm-
ances to each reversal of Board opinions.
In this fact is to be seen the importance of an adequate presentation before
the Board. A taxpayer represented by inefficient counsel who fails to make ade-
quate presentation of his case or timely reservation of his rights at the time of
the hearing is in poor shape to secure a reversal of an adverse decision."
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arrive at the issues and the facts of a tax controversy. How do we
begin to ascertain the issues and facts? Is our basis sound? In other
words, what is the system of pleading?
The first step in what ultimately becomes a board of tax appeals
case is a letter,19 purporting to be written by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, and in fact written by one of hit numerous sub-
ordinates. This fact in itself is astonishing. It is certainly startling
that the basis for all subsequent procedure in litigated tax matters
before the Board of Tax Appeals should be an informal letter ad-
dressed to the taxpayer, written by one of the many assistants of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and that the writer of this letter
instituting the entire action should never again have any connection
therewith except in connection with settlement negotiations and then
not always. Bearing in mind the nature of a formal complaint or
bill in an action-at law or in equity, one needs only to refer to a not
untypical 6o-day letter to note the marked contrast between these
two documents both of which serve to initiate litigation.20
The department's procedure is certainly to be contrasted with
that almost universally characterizing other forms of litigation in
which the first important papers instituting the cause of action are
prepared by a person with legal training who is compelled, by the
very nature of general legal procedure, to devote the requisite study
to the legal theories of his case and who presumably will subse-
quently continue to act for the complainant throughout the course
of the litigation. Thereafter the study and preparation, which precede
the institution of important causes of action, is in most litigation
carefully crystalized in the complaint or bill, carefully prepared and
drawn with some elaboration to set forth exactly the basis for the
cause of action. On the other hand, if the department's procedure
were a criterion for pleading in other causes of* action, it would
suffice for the complainant to set forth some meagre facts referring
back perhaps to extrinsic papers and reports and concluding with
the statement that the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff in a
certain amount. The defendant would, if such were the case, know
as much about the nature of the claim against him as many taxpayers
who receive deficiency letters.
It has been indicated that the letter written by the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue determining a deficiency corresponds in board
"OReferred to in tax parlance as a "6o-day letter".
2"The 6o-day letter does not serve to initiate tax litigation if the taxpayer
chooses to abide by the deficiency determination; on the other hand, if the tax-
payer takes his appeal to the Board the letter does serve as the "complaint".
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practice to what is known in other actions as the complaint or bill.
If this is true, the petition filed by the taxpayer with the Board of
Tax Appeals is analogous to the answer of the defendant in other
cases; the Commissioner's answer then corresponds to the reply in
other cases.
The petition required to be filed by the taxpayer in board of tax
appeals cases may not, like the deficiency letter of the Commissioner,
treat informally the subject matter of the controversy.2' The Board
of Tax Appeals rules carefully indicate what shall be the contents
of the petition,22 and the rules even include for the information of
the taxpayer a form of petition.? The petition prescribed must be
verified; ' if it is not verified with technical perfection a motion to
dismiss will be made immediately.
For the first time we have in the petition a recognizable legal
document in which certain jurisdictional facts- must be alleged and
in which the taxpayer must state the legal errors upon which the
deficiency25 is based, the facts upon which he relies as a basis of
the proceeding and a prayer for relief. In this connection it should
be noted that although the 6o-day letter is vague and indefinite,
as has been indicated, the rules28 provide that the petition should
contain:
"(d) Clear and concise assignments of error alleged to have
been committed by the Commissioner. Such assignments of
error shall be numbered.
(e) Clear and concise numbered statements of the facts upon
which the petitioner relies as sustaining the assignments of error;
except those assignments of error in respect of which the burden
of proof is by Statute placed upon the Commissioner. (See
sections 6oi, 602 of the Revenue Act of 1928.)
The petition shall be complete in itself so as fully to inform
the Board of the issues to be presented. ' 27
211t is true that a most informal document may be enough to establish jurisdic-
tion in the board but it must be later amended.
nSee Rule 5 of the Board of Tax Appeals Rules of Practice; in substance it
requires: (i) proper jurisdictional allegations; (2) the Commissioner's deficiency
determination, etc.; (3) clear and concise assignments of error alleged to have
been committed by the Commissioner; (4) clear and concise statements of fact
sustaining the assignment of errors; (5) prayer for relief; (6) verification, etc.
2See the appendix to the Rules, ibid. 2 4Rule 5, ibid.
25Though he may not be able to discover the theory of the deficiency he must
point out its legal errors. Rather an unfair burden.
28Rule 5, ibid, supra note 22.
27The Board must be informed by the petitioner, who frequently must guess
what is in the mind of the Commissioner's assistant who writes the deficiency
letter. Why let the Board be informed through a prism?
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It is indeed a paradoxical situation which requires a taxpayer to base
a formal petition on an informal letter.
The next document is the Commissioner's answer, which is like-
wise required to be formal and exact. It refers to the petition para-
graph by paragraph and admits or denies the allegations thereof.
As a matter of practical fact, most answers are prepared by at-
torneys in the General Counsel's office who have not theretofore
heard of the controversy and have no time2 8 to make any attempt to
investigate the facts. The result generally is that everything in the
petition, including many purely formal facts, is denied. The tax-
payer is thus put, at least in the beginning, to the necessity upon the
pleadings themselves of proving every fact necessary to his cause of
action.29
Digressing for the moment, one specific illustration will be cited
to show the gravamen of the Department's denial of formal facts.
The petitioner by his counsel alleges as one of the formal allegations
that the tax for the year in question was duly paid, etc.; such allega-
tions are frequently denied although the information is peculiarly
within the knowledge of the department. Counsel must therefore
have his client locate the checks showing payment. Not infre-
quently the case involves a group of petitioners in widely scattered
parts of the country. The taxpayers have paid their taxes in install-
ments. The number of exhibits in the case is immediately increased
by the number of checks-assuming of course counsel is able to collect
these evidences of payment-by no means a simple matter where
the payment was many years ago. If clients are unable to locate
checks, counsel has the alternative of writing to a number of collec-
tors -and receiving-after a lapse of weeks-transcripts of the record.
This laborious collecting of formal facts at a time when counsel is
concerned with procuring the more important facts of the case could
be easily obviated, and the example cited is but one illustration of
other similar situations. It is only fair to urge that the department
admit allegations the truth of which are peculiarly within its own
knowledge.30
2$Rule I4 of the Rules of Practice before the Board of Tax Appeals provides
that the Commissioner shall have 6o days within which to file his answer or 45
days within which to move in respect to the petition.
29it must be recognized that most attorneys in the General Counsel's office
in charge of tax Board litigation on behalf of the government, are favorably
disposed toward stipulation of as many facts as possible, and that they freely
cooperate to this end with the taxpayers' attorneys.
3OCf. for example, § 323 of the New York Civ. Prac. Act which provides that:
"Admission of facts. Any party, by notice in writing, given not later than ten
days before the trial, may call on any other party to admit, for the purposes of
BETTER TAX PLEADING
The Board of Tax Appeals practice is therefore sui generis. In
no other field of legal controversy do we find a series of pleadings
beginning with an informal letter and ending with two documents
having all the formality of court pleadings.31 Is there in tax contro-
versies some special consideration justifying this distinction in
procedure?
A negative answer to this question is not enough. There is in tax
controversies a special consideration making the distinction partic-
ularly unjustifiable. There is in the ordinary controversy no magic
in the plaintiff's first pleading. Not any pleading suffices to ground
the plaintiff's cause of action; the pleading offered must stand the
rigor of a multiplicity of motions designed to throw the litigant out
of the field of combat. But this informal deficiency letter of the Com-
missioner is lifted above the plane of ordinary pleadings; it is endowed
with a presumption of correctness.12 It suffices if .it alleges a de-
the cause, matter or issue only, any specific fact or facts mentioned in such notice.
In case of refusal or neglect to admit the same within six days after service of
such notice, or within such further time as may be allowed by the court or a
judge, the expenses incurred in proving such fact or facts must be ascertained
at the trial and paid by the party so neglecting or refusing, whatever the result
of the cause, matter or issue may be, unless at the trial or hearing the court or a
judge certify that the refusal to admit was reasonable, or unless the court or a
judge, at any time, shall order or direct otherwise. Any admission made in
pursuance of such notice is to be deemed to be made only for the purposes of the
particular cause, matter or issue, and not as an admission to be used against the
party on any other occasion or in favor of any person other than the party giving
the notice. The court or a judge, at any time, may allow any party to amend or
withdraw any admissidn so made on such terms as may be just."
See also New York Civ. Prac. Act, § 322.
31Interesting is the change in Interstate Commerce Commission procedure
with respect to the recapture of excess income-the Commission's only activity
of a money-collecting nature. Several years ago the Commission revised its pro-
cedure, the details of which are not material here. Suffice it to say generally
that the service by the Commission of a tentative recapture report in advance of
hearing and the right of the railroad to inspect the Commission's underlying
records is designed to and does apprise the railroad of the issues and legal princi-
ples involved. Not to be implied is the suggestion that the Board practice be
modeled after the Interstate Commerce Commission practice. The recent change
in the Commission practice does, however, suggest that a loose, vague, uninforma-
tive system of practice is not a necessary concomitant of practice before an ad-
ministrative tribunal.
In other "special proceedings", such as mandamus actions-and appeals to
the Board have been likened to "special proceedings" inasmuch as the Board is
not a Court-the action is started by a "petition". Unlike Board practice, how-
ever, the "petition" in special proceedings is not based on anything analogous to
the Commissioner's informal 6o-day letter.
12Gamm v. Commissioner, 39 F. (2d) 73 (C.C.A. 5th, x93o) aff'g 15 B.T.A. 594
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ficiency;" the reasons assigned by the Commissioner are immaterial
in that they may be unsound or badly expressed. It may conceal
- the theory of the deficiency behind a veil of vague generalities; not
infrequently the letter makes no attempt to explain the Commis-
sioner's theory. There is no relief, statutory or otherwise, from the
vagueness of such a letter. The Commissioner's determination is
prima facie correct and the burden is on the taxpayer to prove that
it is incorrect ;" in addition thereto he must prove all the facts neces-
sary to the computation of the correct deficiency.8
(1929); Onondaga Co. et al. v. Commissioner, 50 F. (2d) 397 (C.C.A. 2d, I931)
certiorari denied 284 U. S. 671 (1931) aff'g 18 B.T.A. 944 (1930); Kaufman v.
Commissioner, 44 F. (2d) 144 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1930) rev'g and aff'g I5 B.T.A. I4I
(1929); American Conservation Service Corp., 24 B.T.A. 183 (1931); E. C.
Hopkins, Exec., 24 B.T.A. 8o5 (1931); E. P. McCabe, et al. Exrs., 23 B.T.A.
1375 (19 3 I);H. A. Whitlock, et al, 22 B.T.A. 1355 (1931); F. L. Roche, 21 B.T.A.
1139 (I93I); G. R. Craven, 21 B.T.A. 78 (1930); E. H. R. Green, I9 B.T.A. 9o4
(193o); C. H. Reinholdt & Co., I3 B.T.A. 9o5 (1928); Rossman, Inc., 13 B.T.A.
1266 (1928).
33 Edgar M. Carnrick, 21 B.T.A. 12, 21 (193o): "If the Commissioner finds one
fact or reason which he believes supports his adverse determination, he is not
required to express his views on any or all other matters relating to the item, and
his failure to deal with them carries no implication as to their treatment. It is not
the Commissioner's method of determination or computation which is the sub-
stance of the proceeding, for the deficiency may be correct despite a weakness in
arriving at it or explaining it. Woodside Cotton Mills Co., 13 B.T.A. 266 (1928);
Jacob F. Brown et al., 18 B.T.A. 859 (1930). 'It is immaterial whether the Com-
missioner proceeded upon the wrong theory in determining the deficiencies. In any
event the burden was on petitioner to show that the assessment was wrong.'
Altschul Tobacco Co. v. Commissioner, 42 F. (2d) 6o9 (1930)." James P. Gossett,
22 B. T. A. 1279 -(1931): "The Board has consistently held that the subject
matter of the proceeding before it is the tax liability of the petitioner. When a
deficiency is determined, the reasons given do not constitute or confine the
issues.... The petitioner may in his petition assail the deficiency for reasons not
theretofore suggested and may go so far as thereby to convert the deficiency into
an overpayment, and the respondent may, on the other hand, defend on new
grounds.... The primary issue is the correctness of the ultimate determination of
deficiency, and the ordinary presumption is not destroyed by the reason given,
even if it be unsound or badly expressed."
'
4Brown v. Commissioner, reported in 193o COMMERCE CLEARING HousE
REPORTS, Par. 9702, modifying 12 B.T.A. 841 (1928); Wright v. Commissioner,
50 F. (2d) 727 (C.C.A. 4th, 1931) certiorari denied 284 U. S. 652 (1931) aff'g 19
B.T.A. 541 (193o); Portage Silica Co. v. Commissioner, 49 F. (2d) 985 (C.C.A.
6th, 1931) aff'g i i B.T.A. 700 (1928); Glendinning, McLeish & Co. Inc., 24 B.T.A.
S18 (i93i) aff'd in 61 F. (2d) 950 (C.C.A. 2d, 1932); W. L. Walls, 21 B.T.A. 1417
(1931); J. B. Dortch, 19 B.T.A. 159 (1930); Watson McMaster, et al, 18 B.T.A.
1119 (1930); Atlas Plaster & Fuel Co., 18 B.T.A. 1123 (1930).
3 Saxman Coal & Coke Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 16; see also: Louis
Friedman, 21 B.T.A. 38 (I93O); H. P. Parker, 14 B.T.A. 1185 (1929)- Ohio Valley
Fluorspar Co., Io B.T.A. 289 (1928).
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No reasonable taxpayer will quarrel with this special endowment
of correctness- bestowed upon the Commissioner's letters. It is
historically well founded and it is necessary as an aid to the collection
of revenues, nor will any sane taxpayer object to the companion
burden-of-proof rule which is little more than another way of saying
the same thing.
Nor will any person sufficiently disillusioned by years of practice
in the courts contend that the informality of the Commissioner's
deficiency letter is per se a fault. Formality and informality are not
the point. The matter is one of substance, not form. It is conceivable
that a letter may express the subject matter with even greater clarity
than a complaint or any strictly formal document. The objection
goes not to the form of the opening pleading but to its contents. A
taxpayer must uphold a burden of proof. The dice are properly
loaded against him. All the more important then for him to know
whereof he speaks. The contents of the deficiency letter are to
him a matter of vital concern; the basis of the deficiency, the piece de
resistance of his cause of action.
We come at this point to another astonishing thing. The Revenue
Act of 1932, Section 272 (a),1a authorizes the Commissioner to send
"notice" of a deficiency by registered mail and the taxpayer is, if
he wishes to appeal from the deficiency determination, authorized
to file a petition within sixty days for a redetermination of the
deficiency. Nothing about what the notice shall say to the taxpayer,
other than that it shall state a deficiency. The statute exhibits
concern in the registered mail provision that the taxpayer shall
receive the "notice". Is it not somewhat amazing that so little con-
cern is manifested about what shall be received? Why so much
concern about the receipt of the notice and so little concern about the
contents thereof?
In actual practice the "notice" is the letter that has been dis-
cussed. These deficiency letters sometimes adequately serve their pur-
pose. For some occasions any instrument will suffice; the fact that
axes will break thread does not justify the failure to use scissors.
Sometimes these deficiency letters laboriously end in justice. Current
economic conditions, however, cry out for expeditious handling of
cases of extreme economic importance to the government and tax-
payer. Because it is so little appreciated, it should be emphasized
that the lack of precision and informal looseness of deficiency letters
impedes the work of the Board of Tax Appeals, the collection of
revenue and the early disposition of controversies.
na47 Stats. 233 (1932), 26 U.S.C.A. § 3271 (1932).
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The essential elements of deficiency letters in practice are:
(a) A recomputation of tax liability, item by item, iccording to
the Commissioner's contentions; and
(b) An explanation of the reasons for the adjustments which
have been made.
In neither of these respects have they uniformity. In neither respect
do they adequately give notice to the taxpayer as to what he must
refute.
The tax recomputations are usually clear as far as they go. The
trouble here is in the starting point. Reference to typical letters
shows that they sometimes start with income as per return, and
sometimes with income as per a revenue agent's report, and some-
times with income as per a previously mailed letter. Because the
letters are often not self-contained, it frequently becomes necessary
in preparing a petition to refer to extrinsic papers such as revenue
agent's reports, 3o-day letters and the like. The objection to the
necessity of referring to extrinsic papers goes not only to the fact
that it is difficult to assemble these papers. The real objection lies
in the more difficult task of reconciling the various figures. In
adjusting returns by partners, for example, the adjustment in the
deficiency letter may be based upon the adjustment of the partner-
ship return. The adjustment may or may not be readily available
to the petitioner for any number of reasons.36 In this connection it
should be noted that there is no uniformity of practice in writing
these 6o-day letters. Not infrequently then laborious study is often
necessary to discover what the letter means. Many letters cannot
be understood without conference with the Bureau of Internal
Revenue in Washington," and this is not always possible in the 6o-
day period allowed for the filing of a petition."
The practice of incorporating by reference agent's reports, 3o-day
letters, etc. ignores pragmatic considerations. It assumes that the
taxpayer can, upon the receipt of a deficiency letter, gather up the
"8As in the case of a retired or special partner.
"In Washington because the file is then there, and it is usually inaccessible
there because it is in transit.
"
8The period cannot be extended. Van Fossan, op. cit. supra note 9 at 19,
"This provision for filing a petition within 6o days has been construed by the
Board and the Courts uniformly to be jurisdictional and a filing within 6o days is
mandatory. This jurisdictional requigite has proven a stumbling block to thous-
ands of would-be petitioners who through misunderstanding, delay of counsel
or otherwise, have attempted to file their petitions subsequent to the expiration
of the statutory period. This failure has necessarily resulted in the dismissal of
all such cases."
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other papers incorporated by reference and sit down to a complete
understanding of his newly found liability. He cannot always do so;
and if he can, it is only by a needlessly complicated reconciliation of
several documents.
The defect in many 6o-day letters lies not so much in the in-
adequate statement of the reasons underlying the Commissioner's
determination; the real defect or vice lies in the failure to state the
grounds or legal principles upon which the Commissioner relies.
It is not unreasonable to place upon the taxpayer the burden of
proving his case. It is hardly reasonable to place upon him the
burden of discovering what case he must prove. The reasoning of
the Commissioner must be known to the taxpayer if he is to know
what facts to plead and later to prove. If he does not know, he will,
as a prudent taxpayer, plead and prove all facts which may be relevant
as he imagines the Commissioner's contentions. Sometimes the
imagination of the most speculative taxpayer is non-plussed. The re-
sult is at least waste;39 often it is an unsound result. The taxpayer's
petition is unnecessarily difficult to follow and the record is needlessly
encumbered. Neither of these facts help the Board to quick and cor-
rect decisions. The citation of several specific illustrations again
warrants a digression. A partnership return shows certain deduc-
tions for salaries paid to several individuals who have recently been
employed by the partnership. The contract of employment requires
these employees to give up their own business and to devote their
efforts to the sale of the partnership services to the employee's former
clients. The deduction is disallowed. Upon all the facts-not
material to this discussion-counsel feels reasonably certain that the
point at issue is whether the payments to the employees is a capital
expenditure, i.e., payment for good will. On the other hand, he is
not certain whether he must also prove, if he proves the payments
are salaries, that the salary is reasonable.40 And it is conceivable
that the disallowance of the deduction is based simply on the fact
that the salary is not reasonable; true it is that this is unlikely because
in such a situation the Commissioner would doubtless allow part of
the deduction.
39As in the Alger-Sullivan case discussed supra note 17.
"
5In Alger-Sullivan Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 17, the 60-day
letter stated that "Your contention that the capital stock issued * * * to em-
ployees constituted a bonus and therefore an allowable deduction is denied. The
information on file in this office discloses that the stock so issued constituted a
sale of capital stock; a capital transaction in which no deduction may be allowed."
The circuit court having found that the stock so issued was bonus stock, the tax-
payer was in the dilemma of having offered no proof on the question of reasonable-
ness-a material element in the deduction of compensation paid or incurred.
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Take the simple case of the disallowance of a deduction for busi-
ness expense. Is the disallowance based on the fact that the deduc-
tion is (i) not a business expense, or (2) that it is not an ordinary
and necessary expense, or (3) that it is not reasonable (in the case
of salary deductions)? Consider the disallowance of a worth-
less debt deduction. Is it based on the fact that the (i) debt is
not worthless, or (2) if it is worthless, that it was not charged
off in the year when ascertained to be worthless, or (3) that the
debt was not charged off? These illustrations-and countless
others could be given-are merely the simple cases and as such
can be handled with reasonable dispatch. The point is that the same
uncertainty carries over into the more complex cases. In addition
thereto, the apparently simple examples cited frequently co-exist
with.more involved points and then the petition-and the record-
become burdened with much matter which might be eliminated.
Consider the case4' of a taxpayer who excluded from income moneys
received, from the state, for services rendered as an engineer. Upon
the receipt of a deficiency letter which included the moneys as gross
income the taxpayer was led to believe that the issue was a simple
question of whether he was a state employee and so exempt.4 The
Commissioner's theory, sustained by the board, was that the tax-
payer was an independent contractor. On appeal the Circuit Court 8
pointed out that the finding that the taxpayer was an independent
contractor entitled him to a deduction for business expense and that
since this question had not been raised at the hearing before the
board, the taxpayer was entitled to have the case remanded for a
rehearing. Here we have an example of the expense and delay to
both government and taxpayer which might otherwise be eliminated.
Here both government and taxpayer find, after bearing the reason-
able expense of a board hearing and appeal to the Circuit 'Court,
that they are sent back to the board for a rehearing and then the
taxpayer is not sure whether he is throwing good money after bad.4
UUnderwood v. Commissioner, 2o B.T.A. 1'17 (1930), rev'd and remanded 56
F. (2d) 67 (C.C-.A 4th, 1932) petition for rehearing denied iVarch 7, 1932.
i2Compensation paid state employees is exempt. Whether the taxpayer is a
state employee is often a question of fact.
43Underwood v.. Commissioner, 56 F. (2d) 67 (1932).
"See e.g., statement of the Circuit Court on the denial of the petition for re-
heaing Underwood v. Commissioner, (56 F. (2d) 67, 74): "If it shall appear at
the hearing of the case by the Board that proper deductions for expenses have
been allowed, the former decision of the board may be reaffirmed;". In other
words, the taxpayer may be confronted with a new hearing which will consider
whether the expenses were proper etc.
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Let us be more specific in dealing with the results of this loose
practice. They may be summarized as follows:
i. The preparation of the taxpayer's petition is rendered more
than necessarily difficult; and when prepared it is apt to be
needlessly complicated.
2. Taxpayers are too frequently required to amend petitions,
which unreasonably adds to their work and the work of the
General Counsel's office.
3. The burden of the preparation of the taxpayer for trial is
increased.
4. Surprise at trials is not infrequent; in any event, the tax-
payer has throughout the period antedating trial a sense of in-
security based upon a doubt whether he has understood the
Commissioner's case.
5. The record is over-voluminous and less helpful to the mem-
ber or members who have the responsibility of a decision.
6. The necessity for rehearings before the Board is multiplied;
and as in the Underwood case45 the Circuit Court of Appeals
finds it more often necessary to remand cases for further evidence.
7. The expense of trial and appeal is augmented for both
government and taxpayer.
8. The work of the Board is unduly increased, which makes
for delay in a particular case and other pending cases.
The writer has not forgotten that deficiency letters are often
prepared at the last moment before the expiration of the statute
of limitations. Any requirements limiting the period now available
to the Commissioner would be against public interest. But a change
of requirement as to the contents of deficiency letters need have no
such effect. The liberality extended to taxpayers in respect to amend-
ments of thepetition maybe granted to the Commissioner in respect to
amendments of the deficiency notice. The practice might be modified
to permit the Commissioner to issue a 6o-day letter which would
indicate briefly one or more contentions on which the deficiency is
based. Should the Commissioner find it desirable at some later date
to base the deficiency on additional theories he could issue an amend-
ed letter and under the existing liberal practice of amending peti-
tions the taxpayer could be given an opportunity to amend the
petition to conform to the amended letter.
Better still would be a practice analogous to that extant in most
jurisdictions whereby the statute of limitations can be tolled for a
short period by the delivery of a summons to the sheriff.48 The depart-
ment could be given the opportunity to toll the statute by the sending
of a preliminary deficiency letter to the taxpayer. It is submitted
*Supra note 43.
46See, for example, the provision'in New York Civ. Prac. Act, § 17.
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that the extension of the statute of limitations by a period of sixty
days or less is, to the taxpayer, more desirable than a practice which
would require the Commissioner to send out a letter within the
normal statute of limitations and then to permit him to amend in
order that the letter adequately inform the taxpayer of the basis
for the Commissioner's deficiency. A practice permitting the Com-
missioner to amend his deficiency letter from time to time would be
less desirable because it would either delay the preparation of peti-
tions in the first instance or cause the taxpayer to amend the petition
to conform to the amended deficiency letter.
The suggested change that the Commissioner be permitted to toll
the statute by a preliminary 6o-day letter is but one step in a modifi-
cation of existing practice. It implies, of course, that the letter
would serve merely to give notice of a deficiency and that it be
followed by some other pleading from which the taxpayer would
have adequate information on which to base his appeal.
The Board of Tax Appeals will soon round out its tenth year.47
At the date of this writing s it has 16,829 cases4 9 on its docket, and,
on the whole, it has functioned with distinction in disposing of 53,437
cases. The difficulty lies not in the functioning of the Board but
rather in the machinery designed to place the issues before the Board.
It is submitted that the state of the practicewarrants a reappraisal
based on our decade of experience with Board practice. A study
should be made of the present procedure with a view to improving the
conditions set forth."'
As a basis for such study some consideration might be devoted to
the following suggestions:
47A brief reference to the board's historical background may be found in
HOLmES, FEDERAL TAXES (6th Ed. 1925) § 4; see also Old Colony Trust Co. v.
Commissioner, supra note io.
41These figures alone warrant some thought on technique designed to clear
the docket of a number of cases.
4Mr. Robert C. Tracy, Secretary of the Board, advises the writer that 70,266
cases were docketed with the Board up to February 28, 1933, that during March
575 new cases were filed and 28 reopened. Up to February 28, 1933 the board
disposed of 53,437 cases, leaving 16,829 cases on the docket. During March the
board disposed of a total of 763 cases, leaving 16,696 cases on hand at April i,
1933. There were on the latter date 1789 cases pending before members for
decision.
Of extreme importance to the correct procedure before the board is the fact
that up to March 31, 1933 only 2407 cases were appealed to the circuit courts,
1739 having been disposed of to March 31, 1933.
OaThe history of procedural reforms, the Field Code in New York fov example,
indicates only too clearly that such reforms are necessarily the work of a group of
persons representing the bench, the bar and the administration. The writer is not
so presumptuous as to assume such a role.
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(i) The informal 6o-day letter should not form the basis of
appeals to the Board of Tax Appeals.
(a) The letter should serve to notify the taxpayer that a
deficiency has been determined. It should toll the statute of
limitations for a short period.
(2) The actual appeal to the Board should be based on a more
formal pleading originating with the Commissioner. His plead-
ing should serve to notify the taxpayer of the theories on which
the deficiency is determined; it may state any number of theories
in the alternative and should not limit the Commissioner to an
original choice of the correct theory.
(a) Some thought should be given a study of a modified
motion practice which would test adequately the sufficiency
of the litigant's theories. 0 Whether motions to strike out the
"complaint" or "answer" for failure to state a cause of action
would be feasible and desirable depends on:
(i) Whether the Board has sufficient jurisdiction for such
practice, and
(2) Assuming the first point, would an extension of motion
practice clutter up the Board's docket to the detriment of
other controversies? Could this be obviated by provision
for the award of costs to be imposed on the unsuccessful
moving party?
(b) The Commissioner should be required to admit (in his
answer) purely formal facts which are peculiarly within his
own knowledge as well as certain facts which are contained in
public records. An alternative provision might be made for
the award of costs to the party put to the proof of formal facts
peculiarly within the knowledge of the opponent.
In conclusion it should be said that the writer has not attempted
to set forth all of the items of Board of Tax Appeals practice which
require consideration and improvement, nor has he offered the above
suggestions as being sufficient to cure the evils pointed out, or as
limiting the study of what should be adopted as the procedure in
respect to these evils. The idea has been, rather, simply to show that
certain evils exist and that the time is ripe for an inventory of Board of
Tax Appeals practice. The need for an improved procedure is par-
ticularly great at the moment because it is so necessary at this
time to handle tax litigation inexpensively and expeditiously. Mat-
ters of procedure also affect the growth of a body of substantive
tax law. Taxes will be with us for a long time, and the growth of
a body of substantive law taxation has assumed an increased im-
portance since the depression.
5OThe writer is not unmindful of existing wide and liberal motion practice before
the board. It apparently fills a need or it would not exist-if this is true, might it
not be worth while to carry it to a logical conclusion and work out the problem
of appeals from such motions?
